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Abstract
This essay addresses the macroeconomics of international ﬁnancial integration
from a European perspective. We ﬁrst analyse the role of international ﬁnancial inte-
gration in promoting economic convergence among members of the European Union.
N e x t ,w ea n a l y s et h ei m p l i c a t i o n so fi n c r e a s i n gﬁnancial linkages, both within Europe
and between Europe and other regions in the world economy. Finally, we assess how
increased ﬁnancial integration has altered the economics of external adjustment.
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an Open Europe: The Role of International Flows of Goods, Services, Capital and Labour, October 16-17
2008. I thank Agustin Benetrix, Martin Schmitz and Barbara Pels for helpful research assistance. Email:
plane@tcd.ie.1 Introduction
The growth in cross-border investment positions in recent years has prompted a multi-
layered global debate about the macroeconomic impact of increased ﬁnancial integration.
One important dimension of this debate has been about its potential contribution to pro-
moting economic convergence through sustained net capital ﬂows from advanced economies
to lower-income countries. A second has been about the increase in macroeconomic inter-
dependence that is generated by enhanced cross-border ﬁnancial linkages. A third has
c e n t r e do nt h em o d i ﬁcations to the economics of external adjustment that are required by
increased international ﬁnancial integration.
Along each of these three dimensions, the European experience over the last twenty
years is highly instructive in establishing a balanced perspective on the macroeconomics of
international ﬁnancial integration. Accordingly, the goal of this paper is to address these
three areas from a European perspective. The scope includes a retrospective analysis of the
evolution of cross-border ﬁnancial integration but is also forward-looking in assessing how
ﬁnancial integration will continue to evolve in the future, both within Europe and between
Europe and other regions of the world economy.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. First, in line with a recent set of studies (Abiad
et al 2008, Herrmann and Winkler 2008, International Monetary Fund 2008), we argue
that the pattern of net capital ﬂows within the European Union has successfully avoided
t h ep e r v e r s ec o n ﬁguration observed in other regions of the world economy: the poorer
members of the European Union have been able to accelerate the convergence process
by absorbing investment from the richer member countries through a persistent sequence
of current account deﬁcits. We attribute this to the multi-dimensional character of the
institutional anchor provided by European Union membership, which has eliminated many
of the barriers to international capital ﬂows that are still faced by other emerging market
economies.
Second, we highlight that ﬁnancial linkages between Europe and the rest of the world
have grown rapidly over the last decade but that the quantitative scale of these invest-
1ments remains quite limited. Moreover, we project that the composition of inter-regional
investment patterns is set to change in the coming years, with increasing equity inﬂows into
Europe from emerging market economies and a possible reversal in the global conﬁguration
of current account imbalances.
Third, we show that international ﬁnancial integration alters the economics of external
adjustment. In particular, shifts in exchange rates and asset prices are increasingly im-
portant as determinants of international balance sheets, while the increase in cross-border
leverage raises exposure to sudden stops in debt markets. However, the operation of these
channels varies tremendously across diﬀerent countries and scenarios, such that the appli-
cation of the new economics of external adjustment requires considerable subtlety.
T h es t r u c t u r eo ft h er e s to ft h ep a p e ri sa sf o l l o w s .I nS e c t i o n2 ,w ec o n t r a s tt h eE u r o -
pean experience in terms of the relation between capital ﬂows and economic convergence
with the evidence available for other emerging market economies and developing countries.
Section 3 assesses the macroeconomic impact of the current level of international ﬁnan-
cial linkages, while also projecting important shifts in the international conﬁguration of
cross-border portfolios in the coming years. Section 4 turns to the economics of exter-
nal adjustment in a ﬁnancially-globalised economy. Finally, some concluding remarks are
oﬀered in Section 5.
2 Financial Integration and Convergence
At a global level, the empirical evidence on the contribution of ﬁnancial openness to eco-
nomic convergence is decidedly mixed (see Obstfeld 2008 for a comprehensive survey). The
large number of empirical studies cover a range of time periods and country samples and
diﬀer in terms of empirical speciﬁcations, estimation techniques and the speciﬁcd e ﬁnition
of ﬁnancial openness that is examined.
In terms of the relation between net capital ﬂows and economic growth, prominent
recent studies have failed to ﬁnd a positive relation between current account deﬁcits and
faster output growth (Prasad et al 2007, Rodrik and Subramainan 2008). However, these
2studies did not include European countries in the sample, such that the results are driven
by the well-known phenomenon that emerging Asia has combined high output growth
with current account surpluses over the last decade, together with the pattern by which
African countries have grown slowly while running aid-ﬁnanced external deﬁcits. In similar
vein, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2008) highlight that, among emerging market economies
and developing countries, the ratio of external debt to GDP has tended to be lowest for
the most productive economies, contrary to the pattern predicted by a simple neoclassical
model. Again, this study excluded the group of Central and Eastern European countries.
While the lack of long time spans of data for these countries means that it is understandable
when this group is excluded from global empirical studies, it makes a substantial diﬀerence
in forming an overall evaluation of the role of ﬁnancial openness in economic development.
In particular, the European experience is much more positive in terms of the relation
between ﬁnancial openness and economic development than is the case for other groups of
non-advanced economies.
2.1 Why is Europe Diﬀerent?
The diﬀerent experiences of emerging Europe and the other country groups can be rec-
onciled by recognising the central role played by institutional development in determining
the scale and nature of international capital ﬂows and whether capital ﬂows translate into
faster productivity and output growt. For instance, Kose et al (2008) emphasise that ﬁnan-
cial integration is beneﬁcial for economic performance only if a threshold level of ﬁnancial
development is attained. These authors also emphasise that ﬁnancial integration primarily
operates through indirect channels by fostering ﬁnancial development, stimulating reform of
key institutions and promoting discipline in macroeconomic policy. This is also supported
by the contribution of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) who show that the direct contribution
of capital ﬂows to welfare is quantitatively small, with a larger impact attainable only if
ﬁnancial integration induces shifts in fundamen t a l st h a tl e a dt oar i s ei nt h es t e a d y - s t a t e
sustainable level of output per capita. Moreover, in terms of the cross-country evidence,
3there is a clearly positive assocation between the quality of domestic institutions and the
ability to attract capital inﬂows (see, amongst others, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2001, Lane
2004 and Alfaro et al 2008).
Accordingly, the most obvious explanation of the ability of converging European coun-
tries to combine net capital inﬂows and fast economic growth is the unique institutional en-
vironment that is provided by the European Union. In particular, the European Union can
be interpreted as a multi-faceted institutional anchor for (actual and prospective) member
countries. Through the adoption of the acquis communautaire, a member country enters
into a long series of commitments that ties its hands in terms of legislative and regulatory
frameworks. Moreover, the deep-rooted and multi-dimensional nature of the commitment
means that EU membership cannot easily be undone, in contrast to other forms of commit-
ment that rely solely on domestic devices such as legislative or constitutional constraints.
Accordingly, EU membership is a highly credible commitment that can be relied upon in
making long-term investment decisions.
In relation to international capital ﬂows, a key principle is equality of treatment between
domestic and foreign actors, such that a foreign investor may be conﬁdent of not being
disadvantaged in the event of contractual and non-contractual disputes. As such, the
importance of the European Union as a commitment device was reinforced by the 1986
Single European Act and the attendant abolition of capital controls by member countries
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
A critical factor in the success of the European Union model is the importance of
complementarities across diﬀerent dimensions of the European Single Market. For instance,
there is a clearly symbiotic relation between trade linkages and ﬁnancial linkages. In one
direction, higher levels of bilateral trade improves the ﬂow of information and also increases
the costs of default and other forms of disruption to ﬁnancial contracts.1 In addition, trade
1Lane (2001) shows that more open economies are better able to attract external ﬁnancing. Rose and
Spiegel (2004) show that bilateral debt positions are positively correlated with bilateral trade linkages, while
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008a) show that bilateral portfolio equity positions are increasing in bilateral
trade. Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) show that the line of causation mostly runs from trade linkages to
4ﬂows create associated ﬁnancial trades, such as in the provision of trade credits and also
in relation to payments services.
In the other direction, bilateral ﬁnancial integration generates new opportunities for
trade in goods and services. Most obviously, a key driver of cross-border trade is foreign
direct investment, since the rise of vertically-integrated production in many sectors means
that much trade takes the form of intra-ﬁrm transactions. Growth in multi-country bank-
ing groups through foreign direct investment in the ﬁnancial sector also promotes trade,
both through the facilitation of cross-border trade in ﬁnancial services and via the general
importance of the banking sector in the transmission of information about the reliability
of counter-parties in trade. Moreover, the ability of non-residents to obtain local sources
of ﬁnance is important in the establishment of new ﬁrms. In addition, the potential to
raise funding from foreign investors either directly or indirectly through the cross-border
funding of the domestic banking system enables the most productive local ﬁrms to enter
export markets.2 In related fashion, international venture capital groups can help prepare
domestic startups to scale up and ﬁnance the upfront costs involved in expanding into
cross-border markets.
It is important to emphasise that the quality of the environment for foreign direct
investment is closely tied to other elements in the European Single Market project. In
particular, freedom of establishment is a bedrock for foreign direct investment, allowing
greenﬁeld investment to expand under conditions that do not discriminate between locally-
owned and foreign-owned ﬁrms. In relation to mergers and acquisitions, the pre-eminence of
European law in guiding decisions on anti-trust issues means that the identity of ownership
cannot protect local ﬁrms from the discplinary eﬀect of potential takeover by foreign rivals.
In similar fashion, the restrictions on the provision of State aid to domestic ﬁrms contribute
to a level playing ﬁeld between domestic and foreign ﬁrms.
The freedom of labour to move between member countries also enhances the gains to
ﬁnancial integration through several channels. The expansion of multinational ﬁr m si sf a c i l -
ﬁnancial linkages.
2See Manova (2006) for a model of the link between credit constraints and international trade.
5itated if such companies are able to freely allocate personnel across geographical divisions.
In relation to the labour market, multinationals are less exposed to potential bottlenecks
in the supply of skilled labour if scarcity can be relieved through migration ﬂows. This
is especially relevant for sectors in which agglomeration externalities are important. For
instance, the expansion of ﬁnancial centres is contingent on the availability of skilled ﬁnan-
cial professionals, which may exceed the potential supply from the domestic labour force.
Along another dimension, in relation to export-platform foreign direct investment, a multi-
national labour force is essential in providing centralised customer service and marketing
to a diverse market.
Next, we turn to the contribution of monetary union in promoting European ﬁnancial
integration. While much can be accomplished even in the absence of a common currency,
the evidence over the last decade is that EMU has played an important role in promoting
ﬁnancial integration across Europe (see European Commission 2008, European Central
Bank 2008, Lane 2006 and Lane 2008, amongst many others). The evidence suggests that
the largest impact has been on bilateral ﬁnancial linkages between the members of the euro
area, but it has also promoted ﬁnancial trade between the euro area and other countries.
The positive beneﬁts of monetary union may be divided into two categories. First, a
common currency promotes cross-border ﬁnancial ﬂows (especially in relation to banks and
portfolio debt) by reducing transactions costs, facilitating risk diversiﬁcation and creating
a common investor base that can interact in deep and liquid ﬁnancial markets. Second,
a credible central bank that delivers low and stable inﬂation and interest rates promotes
ﬁnancial development. While it is debatable about whether EMU was necessary to deliver a
credible monetary regime for some member countries, it may well have been a superior route
to monetary stability for others. In particular, even if the smaller member countries were
able to achieve price stability even while retaining independent currencies, the likelihood
is that this may have involved much greater volatility in interest rates in view of the
impact of exchange rate movements and speculative capital ﬂows. In turn, such volatility
in asset prices and exchange rates would have represented a signiﬁcant deterrent to ﬁnancial
6integration.
Even for those countries that are not yet members of the monetary union, it is likely
the EMU has contributed to a more stable monetary environment. Most obviously, the
commitment to eventual membership of EMU provides important medium-term underpin-
nings for the currencies of the recently-acceded member countries, operating both through
market expectations and via the associated constraints on the conduct of monetary and
ﬁscal policies. A policy anchor of this nature is not available to other emerging market
economies and developing countries. While other countries may invest in alternative com-
mitment devices such as inﬂation targeting regimes or hard exchange rate pegs (backed up
by domestic institutions that foster ﬁscal discipline), the unilateral nature of these alter-
natives makes them qualitatively distinct to the multilateral set of commitments that are
embedded in the macroeconomic policy institutions of the EU.
The multilateral nature of the EU macroeconomic policy framework is reinforced by
two EU-level initiatives. First, the detailed surveillance of the macroeconomic policies of
member countries and the peer review embedded in that process is helpful in the formulation
of national policies, especially in member countries with weaker domestic support for policy
formation. While the Article IV missions of the International Monetary Fund play this role
t os o m ee x t e n ta tt h eg l o b a ll e v e l ,t h ec o n t i n u o u se n g a g e m e n tt h a ti si n v o l v e di nt h eE U
procedures represents a more encompassing approach to policy surveillance. Second, the
transfer of structural funds to new member states may be helpful in establishing domestic
political support for the constraints imposed by EU membership.
While the EU institutional framework is far from perfect, both in terms of design and
implementation, the features described above constitute an environment that has proven
to be highly conducive for ﬁnancial integration. In particular, the stability and openness
underwritten by EU membership sharply diﬀerentiates emerging economies in Europe rel-
ative to otherwise similar economies in Asia, Latin America and elsewhere. The feature
that the European Union is a club that is common to both natural net capital importers
and net capital exporters is also likely important, since the familiarity that is built through
7the continuous interaction between the governments of the member countries and the lower
transaction costs that are achieved through a common regulatory framework promotes bi-
lateral capital ﬂows.3 A similar point is also emphasised by Hermann and Winkler (2008)
who identify the fact that Europe is a region in which advanced and emerging economies
are in close proximity as a diﬀerentiating factor relative to other regions. Of course, in
addition to institutional channels, proximity is also helpful in terms of facilitating the
identiﬁcation and monitoring of cross-border investments.
2.2 The First Wave: The Club of Four
Before the 2004 eastwards expansion of the European Union, the role of external capital
in the four peripheral members of the EU15 (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) gained
considerable attention. All of these countries entered the European Union with a per capita
income well below the EU average and were deemed to qualify for structural funds in order
to accelerate convergence. However, EU-level transfers only constituted one component
of the total cross-border capital ﬂows to these countries. While Ireland ran substantial
current account deﬁcits in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the wake of joining the EU in
1973, these contributed to a substantial country risk premium and, in tandem with a major
ﬁscal imbalance, were associated with substantial currency depreciation and low economic
activity during the mid-1980s. Similarly, Portugal ran large current account deﬁcits during
that period even before it joined the EU in 1986. As with Ireland, these deﬁcits were not
sustainable and the subsequent correction involved a sharp correction.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the macroeconomic environment did not provide a sup-
portive environment for reaping the gains from ﬁnancial integration, since relatively high
inﬂation rates, periodic currency crises and high budget deﬁcits and public debt levels
meant that country and currency risk premia were substantial. Indeed, greater access to
external capital may itself have been a contributory factor to poor ﬁscal discipline in some
cases, since the capability to fund public deﬁcits from external sources may have prompted
3See Vlachos (2004) on the importance of regulatory harmonisation for bilateral capital ﬂows.
8over-borrowing.
Rather, as highlighted by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), the capacity of these countries
to run sustained current account deﬁcits really only emerged during the 1990s. Together
with the much improved macroeconomic policies (in part, anchored by the targets em-
bedded in the Maastricht criteria), the abolition of capital controls and the general global
trend towards greater ﬁnancial integration increased the supply elasticity of capital to these
countries. Moreover, EMU has eliminated currency risk for capital ﬂows between member
countries, further removing frictions from the international ﬂow of capital. As documented
by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), the shift in the institutional environment led to a neo-
classical proﬁle of net capital ﬂows within the European Union with a major increase in
the correlation between income per capita and current account balances.
In documenting the growth in international ﬁnancial integration for these countries, we
begin by examining the evolution of de jure ﬁnancial openness, as captured by the index
compiled by Chinn and Ito (2008). The Chinn-Ito index is re-scaled to score 0 for the
minimum level of ﬁnancial openness in the global sample and 100 for the maximum value
in the global sample. Figure 1 shows that it was only in the 1990s that complete capital
account liberalisation was attained, such that it is not surprising that the full impact of
ﬁnancial openness has only been experienced in recent years. This is evident in the data
for the scale of cross-border investment positions. In particular, following Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2001a, 2007a), we const r u c tav o l u m e - b a s e dm e a s u r eo fde facto international
ﬁnancial integration
IFIit =
FAit + FL it
GDPit
(1)
where FA it and FL it denote the value of foreign assets and foreign liabilities respectively.
At a general level, the IFI ratio is the ﬁnancial analogue to measuring trade openness
by the ratio of exports plus imports over GDP. Figure 2 shows that the de facto level of
ﬁnancial integration for these countries grew rapidly only since the mid-1990s.
Figure 3 plots the current account balances of these economies over 1986-2007. While
9Ireland has mostly run a surplus, the other countries have been in persistent deﬁcit, with the
scale of deﬁcits expanding since 1999. In turn, this has led to a considerable accumulation
of net external liabilities for the Southern European countries, as is shown in Figure 4.
Indeed, by the end of 2006, the ratio of net external liabilities to GDP for Greece, Portugal
and Spain stood at 86.7 percent, 77.9 percent and 60.1 percent respectively.
As a general indicator of ﬁnancial development, Figure 5 shows the evolution of the ratio
of private credit to GDP for these countries, with the ratio for a group of initially high-
income member countries (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and the United Kingdom)
included for comparison purposes. Financial development has rapidly converged for this
group of countries, especially since the mid-1990s. In summary, the general success of
these countries in closing the gap with European Union average income levels provided
an important set of case studies that demonstrated the real possibility that the Central
and Eastern European economies could also achieve convergence by committing to EU
membership.
2.3 The Second Wave: Central and Eastern Europe
Figures 6 and 7 plot the de jure and de facto measures of international ﬁnancial integration
ratios for several groups of emerging market economies and developing countries: the CEE
group of recently-acceded members of the EU from Central and Eastern Europe; Emerging
Asia (Em.Asia); Latin and Central America (LAC); South-Eastern Europe (SEE); and
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)g r o u p . F i g u r e6s h o w st h a tt h eCEE
group had surpassed Latin and America by the end of the sample period to achieve the
highest level of de jure ﬁnancial openness. In contrast, emerging Asia did not engage
in signiﬁcant capital account liberalisation during this period. Figure ?? shows that the
scale of international ﬁnancial integration for the CEE, SEE and (to a lesser extent) CIS
groups has surpassed those for the Em.Asia and LAC groups in recent years, although
these groups has comparable values at the start of the period.
The higher volume of cross-border ﬁnancial positions is even more evident if we conﬁne
10attention to equity-type investments. Following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001a), we deﬁne
the gross equity ratio as
GEQit =
(FDIAit + PEQA it + FDILit + PEQLit)
GDPit
(2)
where FDIAit and PEQAit denote foreign direct investment assets and foreign portfolio
equity assets respectively and FDIL it and PEQL it are the counterpart foreign liability
measures. Figure 8 shows that the GEQ ratios for the CEE and SEE groups had outpaced
t h eo t h e rc o u n t r yg r o u p sb yt h eo ft h es a m p l ep e r i o d .
In relation to net capital movements, Figure 9 shows the evolution of current account
balances for these groups since 1998. As is well known, emerging Asia maintained sizeable
current account surpluses during this period, with Latin America also running surpluses
since 2003 and the CIS group close to balance on average since 1999.4 In contrast, the
CEE and SEE groups have run sizeable current account deﬁcits on a persistent basis
throughout this period. The diﬀerences in net ﬂows are reﬂected in the dynamics of net
international investment positions, as is shown in Figure 10. By 2006, the net foreign asset
position of emerging Asia was close to zero, having improved by 20 percentage points of
GDP since 1998. Albeit to a lesser extent, the CIS and LAC groups have also exhibited a
sharp decline in net external liabilities since 1998. In contrast, the net external liabilities
of the CEE and SEE groups have expanded over this period, reaching 53 percent and
63 percent of GDP respectively by the end of 2006. Accordingly, these groups have been
among the largest net recipients of foreign capital over the last decade.
Table 1 shows the level and composition of external liabilities for 1998 and 2006. The
data show a near-doubling in external liabilities for the CEE group between 1998 and 2006
(with a similar expansion for the SEE group). In contrast, the ratio of external liabilities to
GDP slightly decline for the emerging Asia group over this period and only barely increased
for the Latin and Central American countries. In addition, the de-leveraging process for
4The CIS group is quite heterogeneous, with the inclusion of several major net commodity exporters
helping to explain the improvement in current account balances in recent years.
11these two latter groups resulting in a large shift in the composition of external liabilities
towards equity, especially direct investment. While the CEE group also experienced a
relative decline in the importance of debt ﬁnancing, debt liabilities grew in absolute terms
from 36 percent to 48 percent of GDP. The low level of portfolio equity liabilities is also
quite striking.
We turn to the level and composition of foreign assets in Table 2. By 2006, the gross
level of foreign assets was quite similar in the CEE g r o u pa n dt h ee m e r g i n gA s i ag r o u p ,
with the Latin and Central American countries showing a lower level of asset holdings. In
terms of composition, the share of foreign reserves has declined in most cases, with the most
striking exception being the emerging Asia group. The CEE group is also characterised
by a substantial increase in the share of FDI and portfolio equity assets in total assets,
albeit from a very low base. As is further discussed in Section 3, we may expect that
rising income levels and greater trade openness in the CEE countries will be associated
with greater levels of external FDI and portfolio equity investment on the asset side of the
international balance sheet, than is currently observed. As private-sector portfolios become
more internationally diversiﬁed, the relative size of foreign exchange reserves is likely to
further decline.
Further insight is provided in Table 3 that reports various indicators of domestic ﬁnan-
cial development. Between 1998 and 2006, the CEE group experienced a doubling in the
ratio of private credit to GDP, such that the gap with emerging Asia narrowed considerably
(the private credit to GDP ratio actually fell for the latter group). In terms of securities
markets, all country groups underwent a substantial expansion in the market capitalisation
of equity and bond markets but the growth in stock market capitalisation was highest for
the CEE group. Finally, Table 4 reports measures of institutional quality. The CEE
group scores far higher on the World Bank governance indicator than the other groups;
similarly, its placement in the Doing Business i sf a rh i g h e rt h a nf o rt h eo t h e rg r o u p s .
In summary, the CEE countries are an excellent case study in understanding the poten-
tial gains from international ﬁnancial integration. The large current account deﬁcits of the
12last decade have plausibly facilitated a more rapid convergence rate in output and living
standards than would otherwise have been possible. The ability of the CEE group to run
persistent deﬁcits while growing strongly is a major diﬀerentiating factor relative to other
emerging market economies in Asia and Latin America. The most obvious explanation
is the strong institutional anchor provided by the European Union that limits the risk of
major return-destroying instability in the CEE countries.
This view is broadly consistent with the econometric evidence provided by Abiad et al
(2008). These authors show that capital within Europe has ﬂowed towards lower-income
countries and the scale of net capital ﬂows to lower-income European countries is increasing
in the level of international ﬁnancial integration, whereas this pattern is not found for other
groups of emerging market economies. Moreover, the net capital ﬂows have accelerated the
convergence in income levels within Europe.
Herrmann and Winkler (2008) ﬁnd a similar pattern of results in their analysis of
the determinants of current account balances in emerging Europe and emerging Asia. A
striking feature of their study is the importance of intra-regional ﬁnancial integration:
the current account deﬁcits of emerging Europe are systematically associated with high
levels of consolidated bank claims of the euro area on these countries. Moreover, these
authors identify the high level of FDI in the banking sectors of the CEE group as an
additional inﬂuence on their capacity to absorb sustained new ﬂows. Again, this set of
results is consistent with the hypothesis that emerging Europe beneﬁts from a deep level
of integration with the advanced EU countries, whereas the links between emerging Asia
and its main ﬁnancial counterparty (the United States) are much more tenuous.
The October 2008 World Economic Outlook produced by the International Monetary
Fund also ﬁnds that the pattern of current account deﬁcits is quite diﬀerent for emerging
Europe relative to other emerging regions. In particular, the degree of persistence of large
current account deﬁcits in the CEE countries is atypical relative to historical experience,
as is the important contribution of net FDI inﬂows in ﬁnancing the current account deﬁcits.
In formal regression analysis, the IMF study highlights that those countries in emerging
13Europe that have gone furthest in terms of domestic ﬁnancial liberalisation have been
able to run the largest current account deﬁcits, whereas the level of ﬁnancial liberalisation
is not a good predictor of current account balances for emerging market economies in
other regions. In addition, a striking result from the IMF study is that ﬁscal surpluses
are associated with larger current account deﬁcits across the CEE region. To the extent
that the goal of EU membership and subsequent membership of the euro area fosters
ﬁscal discipline, the positive impact of good ﬁscal policy in reducing risk premia provides
another channel by which the EU institutional framework helps promote net capital ﬂows
to emerging Europe.
For the deﬁcit countries, the gains to ﬁnancial integration should include a faster rate
of productivity growth, as is suggested by the empirical work of Bonﬁglioli (2008) and
Prasad et al (2008). Moreover, the smoothing of consumption over time by allowing deﬁcit
countries to increase consumption in advance of projected productivity growth represents
an important additional welfare gain. We also note that the realllocation of capital across
Europe should also increase welfare for the major surplus nations, by raising the marginal
return on capital and, especially via the FDI component, allowing ﬁrms to improve eﬃciency
through vertical integration of the production process and gain market share in the fast-
growing CEE economies.
While we have emphasised the success of the European model in facilitating net capital
ﬂows towards the catch-up member countries, this process is far from complete. Despite the
improvements in recent years, the ﬁnancial systems in the CEE countries remain under-
developed. For instance, the relatively minor contribution of portfolio equity inﬂows has
been emphasised by Stulz (2006), who argues that CEE countries generally scores poorly
in terms of corporate governance, such that foreign investors face the risk that proﬁts are
diverted either by insiders or through political intervention.5 Accordingly, we may expect
that this source of external investment could play a more important role in the future to
the extent that the CEE economies undertake suﬃcient corporate reforms to match best-
5See also Buiter and Taci (2003) and Arvai (2005).
14practice governance standards. More generally, Masten et al (2008) emphasise the dynamic
complementarity between ﬁnancial integration and ﬁnancial development that is evident in
the European data. In particular, these authors identify membership of the euro area as
a key step that will accelerate ﬁnancial development in the CEE economies by eliminating
the non-trivial currency risk that remains and further embedding these economies in the
institutional framework provided by more complete participation in the institutions of the
EU.
Finally, as the current global ﬁnancial crisis makes clear, running a large current account
deﬁcit inevitably carries risks in that a sharp reversal in capital ﬂows can lead to severe
macroeconomic disruption. While the CEE group has experienced some stress, it remains
to be seen whether the blanket of EU membership will allow these countries to avoid the
drastic meltdown that has been the fate of Iceland. We return to this issue in Section 4.
3 Europe and Financial Globalisation
As was argued in Section 2, the common institutional environment provided by the Euro-
pean Union has promoted increased bilateral ﬁnancial integration among European coun-
tries. In terms of speciﬁc initiatives, the considerable EU eﬀort to promote ﬁnancial inte-
gration has provided important policy support for the elimination of national barriers to
cross-border investment. Most importantly, the creation of EMU has led to a dramatic
increase in ﬁnancial integration among the member countries (see European Commission
2008, Lane 2006, Lane 2008). However, European countries have also been to the forefront
in ﬁnancial globalisation, with rapid growth in the scale of ﬁnancial claims and liabilities
vis-a-vis other regions in the world economy. In this section, we assess the current scale of
international ﬁnancial linkages, before turning to projections concerning the likely future
evolution of cross-border positions.
153.1 International Financial Linkages
In addition to the rapid increase in intra-European cross-border investment positions, the
scale of international ﬁnancial linkages between Europe and the rest of the world has also
grown over the last decade. The gains to global ﬁnancial integration should largely mirror
those to regional integration and indeed, in some dimensions, exceed them. For instance,
a global portfolio should provide greater scope for diversiﬁcation than a purely regional
portfolio, in view of diﬀerences in trend paths, business cycles and industrial structures
across regions. In relation to foreign direct investment, the gains to the globalisation of
trade ﬂows are facilitated by the growth of multi-country ﬁrms, in view of the importance
of vertically-integrated ﬁrms in reaping the potential eﬃciencies from global supply chains
and global distribution networks. However, the ﬂip side of greater global risk sharing is the
increased exposure to external shocks.
There are several channels by which global ﬁnancial shocks are transmitted. Most
directly, the greater is the scale of ﬁnancial holdings of European investors in a given
region, the more exposed they are to shifts in that region’s asset prices and exchange
rates. However, the indirect channel is probably more powerful, whereby ﬁnancial events
in one region induce a re-pricing of assets in other regions. These indirect eﬀects operate
through the impact on sentiment and risk aversion indicators, in addition to the real linkages
provided by international trade whereby the earnings of domestic ﬁrms are aﬀected by
economic prospects in trading partners.
In relation to direct holdings, the benchmark textbook presentation of ﬁnancial global-
isation predicts a symmetric pattern by which equally-endowed economies hold equivalent
stakes in each other’s economies. However, a wide range of factors give rise to the current
conﬁguration by which global ﬁnancial holdings are highly asymmetric, both in terms of
structural net positions and the composition of international balance sheets.
In relation to net imbalances, the dispersion of net foreign asset positions has increased
over the last two decades, driven by persistent patterns in current account imbalances. Non-
zero net external positions inﬂuence the dynamics of the international economy through a
16range of channels. In relation to ﬁnancial integration, adverse global ﬁnancial shocks (that
is, a common decline in all asset prices around the world) exert a positive valuation impact
on debtor economies and a negative valuation eﬀect on creditor countries. In addition to
the net position, the composition of the international balance sheet also matters in relation
to the macroeconomic impact of international ﬁnancial linkages. In terms of categorical
composition, a region will have diﬀerential sensitivity to shocks in diﬀerent asset categories
according to their weights in foreign assets and liabilities.
In particular, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007a) highlight that most advanced economies
are “long equity, short debt” with portfolio equity and FDI prominent on the asset side
of the international balance sheet, while the portfolio and non-portfolio debt categories
are disproportionately represented in relation to external liabilities. If an equity return
premium exists, this type of “venture capital/hedge fund” structure can produce positive
net returns on average. However, as is underlined by the 2007-2008 banking crisis, this
structure increases potential vulnerability to roll-over risk on the funding side.
Along the geographical dimension, a large literature has explored the determinants of
the geographical composition of international investment positions, with gravity factors
such as distance, cultural and trade linkages looming large.6 These factors are relevant
in explaining the strong intra-European bias in the cross-border holdings of individual
European countries. However, such variables are also helpful in understanding the extra-
European component of international investment positions. For instance, in relation to the
portfolio equity assets of the aggregate euro area, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007d) show
that the main factors are the stock market capitalisation of the partner country and the
volume of bilateral trade with the euro area, with international ﬁnancial centres taking a
disproportionate share. At the level of individual European economies, additional factors
such as colonial history and bilateral distance also help to explain the variation across
countries in the importance of particular investment destinations.
Table 5 shows the geographical distribution of the external assets of the euro area. The
6A partial list includes Sarisoy Guerin (2006), Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) and Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2008a).
17patterns show that the primary destinations for the euro area are other locations in the
aggregate European economy. The United States is the main extra-European destination,
in line with its high share in global market capitalisation. However, Asia is a fairly minor
destination for European investors. Accordingly, the direct exposure of European investors
to shocks in external markets is relatively minor, with the limited exception of disturbances
in the US markets.7 That said, the levels of external exposures are much larger than in
previous decades. For instance, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007c) calculate that European
asset and liability positions vis-à-vis the United States grew by a factor of four over 1984-
2004, such that shifts in euro-dollar exchange rates and asset prices will have a much more
powerful valuation impact than in the 1980s.
Another dimension to the analysis of international ﬁnancial linkages relates to the cur-
rency composition of the external balance sheet. As is emphasised by Lane and Sham-
baugh (2007, 2008), shifts in exchange rates have asymmetric valuation eﬀects acccording
to whether a given country is long or short in various currencies. The example of the United
States is well known whereby it has a sizeable short position in the US dollar and is long
in European currencies (see Tille 2003, Gourinchas and Rey 2007a and Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti 2007b). Accordingly, a decline in the dollar vis-a-vis the euro confers a positive
valuation gain for the portfolios of American investors.
In relation to Europe, Lane and Shambaugh (2007) show that the creation of EMU has
led to a radical shift in the currency exposures of the member countries. In particular,
the bulk of the foreign assets and liabilities of the member countries are in euro, thereby
insulating returns from shifts in exchange rates. The prominence of the euro is not just
related to the high level of intra-EMU cross-border investment but also is assisted by the
growing international role of the euro, with non-European investors increasingly issuing
debt in euro and seeking to buy euro-denominated assets. In terms of remaining currency
7Lane (2006) emphasises that there is considerable heterogeneity across individual members of the euro
area. For instance, Spain has relatively large direct investment positions in Latin America, while Austria
has especially high holdings in Central and Eastern Europe. Accordingly, external ﬁnancial shocks may
have asymmetric eﬀects across the euro area.
18exposures, as is documented by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007c), European economies are
typically long the dollar, such that a weak dollar hurts the international balance sheets of
European countries.
While the scale of international investment positions has grown rapidly over the last
two decades, it is important to appreciate that these positions remain relatively limited,
especially in relation to inter-regional positions. That is, the vast bulk of domestic assets
are owned by domestic residents or the residents of neighbouring countries, with the local
component in domestic wealth remaining predominant. Accordingly, the more powerful
channel by which global ﬁnancial integration matters is an indirect one, by which global
factors are increasingly important in driving asset returns (see Bekaert 2005 and Baele
and Inghelbrecht 2008, amongst others). In part, the global component in returns can
be related to a global component in earnings, with the current and future proﬁtability
of ﬁrms linked through international trade and common technological trends that explain
the global component in business cycles and long-term growth paths. However, another
link is provided through a global factor in discount rates and risk premia. While the
internationalisation of the investor base helps to explain this component, it also relates to
cross-regional transmission in sentiment, even across investors that do not share similar
portfolios.8 Indeed, it is not clear the extent to which the sentiment channel can be closely
tied to the extent of cross-border holdings, since the sentiment channel appears to operate
in similar fashion across markets with varying degrees of integration with the international
ﬁnancial system.
3.2 Future Trends
A major asymmetry in the current distribution of cross-border investment positions are
the diﬀerent patterns exhibited by advanced and emerging/developing economies. First, in
8Sentiment should be interpreted in broad terms. For instance, a central feature of the current crisis
is the re-evaluation of the appropriate degree of leverage that should be taken by banks. This “paradigm
shift” can be interpreted as a common technological shock across countries, in the sense that the technology
of banking has shifted for many advanced economies.
19terms of net positions, with the prominent exception of the Central and Eastern European
economies that was discussed in Section 3, it is well known that capital has been running up-
hill over the last decade, with a positive net ﬂow towards the advanced economies. Second,
as is emphasised by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008b), the gross scale of the international
balance sheets of emerging market economies and developing countries is substantially lower
than those for the advanced economies: the typical emerging market economy or developing
country has much smaller cross-border asset and liability positions (with a median of 70 to
80 percent of GDP) than an advanced economy (for which the median value is well over
200 percent of GDP).
Third, the composition of foreign assets and liabilities is far diﬀerent between advanced
and non-advanced economies. In particular, following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007a),
the typical non-advanced economy is “long debt, short equity” with portfolio debt assets
(mostly in the form of oﬃcial reserves) the largest item in terms of foreign assets, while FDI
and portfolio equity liabilities have grown rapidly in relative importance. As is pursued by
a rapidly-growing literature, these characteristics can be explained in terms of diﬀerences
in relation to domestic ﬁnancial development, the institutional and regulatory environment
and the distribution of risk (see, amongst others, Dooley et al 2003, Mendoza et al 2007
and Caballero et al 2008).
However, as is discussed by Lane and Schmukler (2007) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2008b), it is highly plausible that the current conﬁguration will not persist. In particular,
progress in ﬁnancial-sector and institutional reform and ongoing growth in income per
capita and trade openness should lead to a more balanced composition of capital ﬂows to
the developing world and, in the other direction, a broader approach to outward investment
from this group of countries.
Such a shift would have several ramiﬁcations. First, a rebalancing of outward portfolios
would lead to a decrease in the growth of liquid reserve assets, making credit conditions
tighter for the issuers of such assets (primarily the US government and, at least until
recently, related agencies). On the other hand, it would expand the investor base for non-
20reserve assets. To the extent that gravity factors inﬂuence the geographical allocation of
outward investment, it is noteworthy that a signiﬁcant part of the expansion will take
the form of regional cross-border investments among developing countries. However, such
forces are strongest only if there exist high institutional standards, such that the ﬁnan-
cial markets of the advanced economies will remain prime beneﬁciaries in the absence of
a catch-up in the investment environment in the lower-income countries. Since the Euro-
pean evidence is that low bilateral exchange rate volatility stimulates ﬁnancial trade, the
prospects for regional ﬁnancial integration in other zones will be inﬂuenced by develop-
ments in exchange rate arrangements. For instance, if other emerging Asian economies
targeted the RMB as a currency anchor, it may facilitate ﬁnancial integration based on an
RMB-zone.
In relation to the growth in investment from non-traditional sources in the non-reserve
assets of the advanced economies, it is widely appreciated that a critical factor will be the
political viability of a rising economic role for developing-world investors. While increased
familiarity through the success of early investments such as Lenovo’s acquistion of IBM’s
PC business has assuaged many initial fears, there remain widespread concerns about the
strategic motives of some types of investors from these countries. In particular, the role of
state-owned ﬁrms in natural resource and other key sectors and the agenda of large-scale
sovereign wealth funds have led to a vigorous debate in several advanced economies about
the potential risks of a fully-liberal approach to capital inﬂows.
While “good practice codes” such as those under development by the IMF in relation
to sovereign wealth funds are helpful in addressing immediate concerns, it is likely that
such problems will fade away over the medium term. In particular, as outward investment
from the developing world is increasingly driven by commercially-driven entities (whether
in private ownership or publicly-owned but with a commercial mandate), it will be more
diﬃcult to argue that such actors are fundamentally diﬀerent from their counterparts in
the advanced economies.
The same types of reforms that would lead to convergence in the international invest-
21ment behaviour of developing and advanced economies are also the reforms that should
lead to a contraction in the current account surpluses of these countries or even the incip-
ient emergence of substantial current account deﬁcits. After all, as was already discussed
in Section 2, the baseline neoclassical model would predict that these countries should be
net capital importers since anticipations of higher future income should lead to an increase
in current consumption and a high marginal product of capital should draw in extra in-
vestment from overseas. If distortions in the domestic ﬁnancial system are resolved and
complementary reforms implemented - such as improved social security systems in coun-
tries such as China - the net ﬂow of capital to the developing world may begin to resemble
the intra-European pattern.
For instance, Dollar and Kraay (2006) generate model-based scenarios in which China
runs average current account deﬁcits of 2-5 percent of GDP over the next 20 years. Since
similar calculations would apply for many other surplus countries and the relative impor-
tance of developing countries in global income should grow rapidly through a combination
of high volume growth and trend real appreciation, a collective shift of these countries
towards external deﬁcits would represent a major shift in the world ﬁnancial system that
would either require other countries to run counter-part surpluses or an increase in world
real interest rates.
The convergence process just described is unlikely to occur in a smooth fashion. In
particular, the current ﬁnancial turmoil in the advanced economies serves yet again to
highlight the risks embedded in ﬁnancial liberalisation. Moreover, Martin and Rey (2006)
show that vulnerability to self-fulﬁlling pessimism is greater among lower-income countries,
while less-liquid domestic ﬁnancial systems are also less resilient in the face of international
portfolios shifts. For theses reasons, developing countries are likely to remain cautious
in setting the pace of ﬁnancial integration, preferring gradualism to big-bang approaches.
While the evidence of Ranciere et al (2008) is that ﬁnancial liberalisation can generate
higher long-term growth even at the price of a bumpier ride, the optimal pace of liberalisa-
tion may well be slower in a more complex international ﬁnancial system. However, even a
22gradualist pace of reform should lead to major shifts in the international conﬁguration of
cross-border investment positions over a 10-15 year horizon.
4 Financial Integration and External Adjustment
In Section 3, we highlighted that a feature of European ﬁnancial integration has been the
ability of lower-income members of the European Union to run persistent and sizeable
current account deﬁcits. At a diﬀerent level of aggregation, we also argued in Section 4
that the expansion in ﬁnancial ﬂows between Europe and the rest of the world means that
Europe is fundamentally integrated into the conﬁguration of global imbalances, even if the
European aggregate economy has not run sizeable trade surpluses or deﬁcits. Accordingly,
in this section, we turn our attention to the implications of ﬁnancial integration for the
external adjustment process by which large imbalances are unwound.
In particular, we highlight three mechanisms by which ﬁnancial integration alters the
economics of external adjustment. First, if the value of external assets and liabilities is
sensitive to currency movements, then the role of the exchange rate in facilitating external
adjustment is altered. Second, ﬁnancial integration has extended the range of internation-
ally tradable assets beyond debt to include portfolio equity and FDI categories. Third,
ﬁnancial integration has facilitated increased leveraging of positions.
Traditionally, the main role for the exchange rate in external adjustment has been via
its (lagged) impact on the trade balance. However, if countries have non-zero net positions
in diﬀerent currencies, exchange rate movements also aﬀect the net foreign asset position
through a valuation channel. Since gross cross-border holdings have increased rapidly over
the last twenty years, the quantitative scale of the valuation chanel is gaining increasing
attention. However, the importance of the valuation channel of exchange rate movements
for external adjustment varies across diﬀerent environments. For instance, it is not relevant
in resolving imbalances that are purely between member countries in the euro area: as is
emphasised by Lane and Shambaugh (2007), a striking feature of EMU is that the major
proportion of both the foreign assets and foreign liabilities of the member countries are in
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The valuation channel takes on more relevance in the case of the recently-acceded mem-
ber states. Although the prominence of inward FDI has reduced the reliance of foreign-
currency debt as a source of funding and oﬃcial foreign-currency reserves are very high
among this group, Table 6 shows that several of these countries still have considerable
net aggregate foreign-currency exposures. For these countries, exchange rate depreciation
may well improve the trade balance but would be also be associated with an increase in the
domestic-currency value of external liabilities. Moreover, even if the aggregate net impact
is muted by the high reserves held by the central bank, sectoral balance sheet exposures
(such as households with foreign-currency mortgages) could be substantial. However, the
negative domestic impact is mitigated by the prominence of foreign-owned banks in making
foreign-currency loans to domestic residents: if default rates go up, much of the decline
in bank proﬁts will be shouldered by foreign investors, through a decline in the return on
foreign direct investment in the banking sector. Finally, it is also wise to keep in mind
the benign scenario in which high productivity growth in these countries generates cur-
rency appreciation, which exerts a positive valuation eﬀect by reducing the real value of
foreign-currency debt.
However, most recent discussion of the valuation channel has been in the context of
the resolution of global imbalances. Tille (2003), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007c) and
Gourinchas and Rey (2007) have highlighted the capital gains that accrue to the United
States as a consequence of dollar depreciation. The counterpart capital losses hit the
balance sheets of foreign holders of dollar-based assets. Accordingly, the valuation channel
provides a negative spillover mechanism by which the correction of an external deﬁcit in
one country may adversely aﬀect other countries through balance sheet eﬀects.
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007d) quantitatively assess the potential exposure of Euro-
pean economies to negative valuation eﬀects associated with a range of scenarios by which
the US external imbalance may be resolved. The analysis employs the IMF’s Global Eco-
nomic Model (GEM) to assess the quantitative impact of alternative adjustment scenarios.
24However, even under a disruptive adjustment scenario, the present value of the currency-
based valuation losses suﬀered by the euro amounts to only 4 percent of GDP. This reﬂects
the still-limited extent of inter-regional ﬁnancial holdings and the strong intra-regional bias
in the cross-border investment positions of European countries. At the end of 2005, Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007d) calculate that the net dollar holdings of the euro area amounted
to 16.8 percent of GDP, which is a much lower level of exposure relative to major dollar
investors such as Japan (38.5 percent of GDP) and China (29.2 percent of GDP).
Other studies also ﬁnd that the exposures embedded in cross-border ﬁnancial hold-
ings remain limited, even if much bigger than in previous periods. Lane and Shambaugh
(2007) show that a 20 percent dollar depreciation would generate average capital losses for
advanced economies of 3.3 percent of GDP. While developing countries that traditionally
carry a large quantity of dollar-denominated debt would beneﬁt to the tune of 3.5 percent of
GDP, the group of emerging market economies have by now accumulated positive net dollar
holdings and would lose 2.9 percent of GDP. Using a diﬀerent data set, Warnock (2008)
calculates the impact of a simultaneous, unexpected 10 percent decline in the U.S. dollar,
U.S. equity markets, and dollar-denominated bonds and ﬁnds that foreign investors would
lose approximately $1.2 trillion in ﬁnancial wealth, which is about 5 percent of global ex-US
GDP. In the context of the current turmoil, Beltran et al (2008) show that the exposure of
foreign investors to declines in the value of US asset-backed securities.
In relation to the euro area, Di Mauro et al (2008) calculate that currency movements
are responsible for the bulk of the adverse shift in the international investment position
of the euro area over 2000 to 2006, with the cumulative impact of exchange rate changes
amounting to a loss of 5 percent of GDP. This dominates the impact of the cumulative
current account of minus 1.8 percent of GDP and asset price movements of minus 1.3
percent of GDP. (Once the oﬀsetting impact of GDP growth on the ratio of net external
liabilities to GDP is taken into account, the total change in this ratio was minus 6.0 percent
of GDP during this period.)
In addition to the valuation eﬀects associated with currency movements, the growth
25in cross-border equity positions has also altered the qualitative relation between output
growth and the external position. Traditionally, faster output growth was associated with
an improvement in the ratio of external liabilities to GDP, since liabilities mostly took the
form of non-contingent debt. However, if foreign liabilities are in the form of equity-type
instruments, an improvement in economic performance will typically be associated with
an increase in the proﬁtability of domestic ﬁrms, increasing investment income outﬂows to
foreign equity investors and raising the value of external liabilities. Accordingly, faster
output growth in itself will not tend to improve the net external position: the trade
balance must do most of the work in improving the external position. Of course, this is
just a manifestation of the risk-sharing properties of equity-type claims: the debtor does
not get to retain all the upside from faster output growth.
In related fashion, the increased share of equity-type claims in foreign liabilities and
foreign assets aﬀects the relation between asset markets booms and busts and the external
account. For instance, the rapid increase in the market capitalisation of Nokia in the
late 1990s generated a large increase in the value of Finland’s external liabilities, since
Nokia shares were widely held by foreign investors. By the same token, foreign ownership
of domestic shares means that a decline in the domestic stockmarket translates into an
improvement in the net external position. Again, this is just risk sharing in action: Finland
could aﬀord an increase in its external liabilities during the late 1990s since domestic
residents were also enjoying the gains from the increase in the value of Nokia shares, while
the adverse domestic wealth eﬀect from a falling stockmarket is mitigated through foreign
participation in the domestic market.
The sensitivity of the external account to ﬂuctuations in asset prices has most relevance
for those countries that have a high weight of marked-to-market instruments in the interna-
tional balance sheet. Accordingly, this is more relevant for the most advanced economies,
in which ﬁn a n c i a lm a r k e t sa r em o r ed e v e l o p e d . F i n a l l y ,w en o t et h a tt h e r ei sah i g hd e g r e e
of common co-movement in asset returns across regions. Global gains in equity values
improve the external positions of those countries that are long in equity-type instruments
26and hurt the external position of those that are short in such assets. Accordingly, a global
asset price boom improves the net external position of countries such as the United States
and the United Kingdom and harms issuers of external equity liabilities such as the Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries and other emerging market economies. Conversely, a
global decline in asset prices (as has occurred over the last several months) has a negative
impact eﬀect on the external positions of the former group but represents a net valuation
gain to the latter group.
The third mechanism that we highlight is the vulnerability embedded in leveraging. As
was noted above, many advanced economies ﬁnanced growth in the scale of gross foreign
assets by increasing the level of external debt. A high degree of leverage means that
problems in credit markets may be important even for countries that have a zero or positive
net international investment position, since liquid external liabilities are not matched well
with illiquid external assets. Accordingly, such economies are vulnerable to roll-over risk
and sudden stops in capital inﬂows, with attendant implications for the currencies of these
countries. It follows that the appropriate horizon for risk management should be extended
beyond major net debtors to include also those with mis-matched balance sheets in term
of liquidity proﬁles. In a European context, there is a clear diﬀerence between members
of the euro area and non-member countries in terms of vulnerability of liquidity risk. In
particular, the sensitivity of currency values to even small shifts in desired portfolio weights
is much greater for non-members with small domestic ﬁnancial markets. Moreover, foreign-
currency debt is more prevalent for non-members, such that the ability of the domestic
monetary authority to provide liquidity to the domestic banking system is compromised.
Accordingly, the euro area is a “safe haven” for smaller member countries that would face
greater liquidity risk outside EMU.
Moreover, the interaction between external wealth eﬀects and domestic sectoral balance
sheets may be important for domestic macroeconomic performance, since the net worth of
banks, ﬁrms, households and the government may be aﬀected by currency-induced valuation
shifts. In this regard, an important goal for future research is to establish the conditions
27under which such valuation movements may have a stabilising inﬂuence versus scenarios
under which the impact is pro-cyclical.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has sought to make three main points about the impact of ﬁnancial openness
on the European economy. First, we have argued that EU institutional environment has
allowed capital to “ﬂow downhill” to emerging European countries, thereby accelerating
convergence. This experience stands in stark contrast to the stylised facts that pertain to
other emerging market regions and the most obvious explanation is these regions have no
adequate counterpart to the institutional anchor that is provided by EU membership.
Second, we have underlined that Europe is not a closed ﬁnancial system, with the scale
of external ﬁnancial linkages between Europe and the rest of the world growing rapidly over
the last ﬁfteen years. However, it is important to acknowledge the scale of cross-border
holdings in non-European countries remains quite limited, such that the impact of direct
ﬁnancial linkages should not be overstated. Rather, the more powerful global ﬁnancial
transmission mechanism relates to an indirect sentiment channel, which remains poorly
understood. In relation to international ﬁnancial linkages, we have also emphasised that
these are likely to shift in the coming years, with a more symmetric distribution of assets
and liabilities between the currently-advanced and currently-emerging economies that will
look quite diﬀerent to the current conﬁguration.
Third, we have argued that increased ﬁnancial integration has altered the economics
of external adjustment, with the growth in cross-border holdings meaning that shifts in
exchange rates and asset prices have a potentially larger role to play in the correction
of external imbalances. However, we have argued that the importance of such valuation
eﬀe c t sv a r i e sa c r o s sd i ﬀerent scenarios and had diﬀerent implications according to the
precise composition of a country’s international ﬁnancial sheet.
Finally, we have also highlighted that increased ﬁnancial integration has also increased
vulnerability to liquidity problems, to the extent that gross debt liabilities have signiﬁcantly
28increased for many European countries. Even if the current global ﬁnancial crisis does lead
to major macroeconomic disruptions in Europe, it should serve as a wake-up call to improve
a European and global ﬁnancial stability system that is inadequately designed to cope with
the globalisation of ﬁnancial ﬂows.
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Figure 1: Chinn-Ito Index for EU4.
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Figure 2: International Financial Integration: EU 4 Group. Note: Author’s calculations
































Figure 4: Net External Positions, 1986-2006. Note: Ratios of net foreign assets to GDP.
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Figure 10: Net Foreign Asset Positions, 1998-2006.
44Table 1: Level and Composition of Foreign Liabilities
1998
Shares
FLY PEQL FDIL DEBTL
CEEC 57.3 5.4 31.8 62.8
Em. Asia 54.0 6.1 28.0 65.9
LAC 60.0 7.3 29.4 63.2
CIS 52.2 0.3 31.0 68.7
SEE 51.0 2.3 15.4 82.3
2006
Shares
FLY PEQL FDIL DEBTL
CEEC 104.3 7.1 46.4 46.0
Em. Asia 52.5 27.7 33.6 38.6
LAC 66.7 20.0 41.8 37.8
CIS 79.4 3.9 37.4 58.7
SEE 117.9 1.8 42.3 55.8
Note: Author’s calculations, based on data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007a).
45Table 2: Level and Composition of Foreign Assets
1998
Shares
FAY PEQA FDIA DEBTA FXRES
CEEC 32.9 1.4 3.3 47.5 47.8
Em. Asia 31.0 1.3 11.8 41.8 45.1
LAC 26.7 5.3 15.8 49.9 29.0
CIS 12.5 0.3 1.7 49.8 48.2
SEE 27.2 0.4 11.8 47.0 40.9
1998
Shares
FAY PEQA FDIA DEBTA FXRES
CEEC 50.9 5.8 15.8 40.2 38.3
Em. Asia 50.0 2.1 8.2 27.4 62.4
LAC 36.9 9.8 19.6 42.5 28.1
CIS 56.3 2.5 2.5 63.2 31.8
SEE 55.3 2.5 6.7 42.9 48.0
Note: Author’s calculations, based on data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007a).
46Table 3: Financial Development Indicators
Year CEE Em.Asia LAC CIS SEE
Private Credit 1998 26.6 61.5 36.4 8.1 28.7
2006 52.7 58.1 34.8 23.1 39.2
Stock Market Capitalisation 1998 10.8 27.0 20.7 1.2 3.7
2006 31.1 57.5 40.1 14.3 38.3
Debt Securities 1998 44.6 54.9 40.5 29.7
2006 66.0 70.8 60.7 51.2
Note: Author’s calculations based on data from World Development Indicators and BIS.
47Table 4: Institutional Quality Indicators
CEE Em. Asia LAC CIS SEE
World Bank Governance Indicator 1998 62.0 44.3 48.8 33.3 36.0
2006 63.0 41.3 45.8 33.0 44.8
World Bank Doing Business Rank 2006 45.0 88.6 90.5 96.3 99.8
Note: Author’s calculations based on data from World Bank.
48Table 5: Geographic Distribution of International Investment Position of the Euro Area
EU27 US China Japan ROW Oﬀshore
FDIA 36.7 19.9 0.8 2.2 29.5 10.8
FDIL 44.6 23.8 0.1 2.8 16.0 12.7
PEQA 24.2 33.3 1.7 9.0 21.0 10.8
PDA 36.4 32.1 0.1 3.3 14.1 12.8
OIA 52.0 13.3 0.6 1.7 21.4 10.0
OIL 47.7 12.8 0.5 2.4 21.0 14.2
Note: Author’s calculations based on data from European Central Bank,
49Table 6: Foreign Currency Exposures
FXAGG NETFX
Bulgaria 3.6 5.3
Czech Republic 17.4 26.8








Note: FXAGG is index of aggregate foreign currency exposure; NETFX is aggregate
foreign currency exposure, scaled by GDP. Source: Lane and Shambaugh (2008).
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